Boeing Due Diligence Deck
QuestionScreeningEvidenceRisksControlsDecision
Integrity due diligence · Prepared for Green&co

Can Green&co work with Boeing?

Third-party risk assessment of The Boeing Company
NorthCap · Group Boeing 2Ilhan Akoglu · Colin Borremans · Hugo Descampe · Arnaud Laloux · Alexandre Mahy
LLSMF2905 · UCLouvain · October 2026
NorthCap meeting room

Green&co asked one question; we answered it in five steps

Can we work with Boeing without going beyond our risk appetite?Green&co
01

Screen

Five exposure criteria (ICC)

02

Investigate

Profile and adverse news

03

Rate

Impact × likelihood

04

Test controls

What Boeing does about it

05

Decide

Go, conditions or no go

Source: ICC (2015); Green&co risk appetite; NorthCap analysis.

Screening: the exposure comes from governments and the industry, not from the ownership

Exhibit 1Five exposure criteria of the risk-based assessment
RBA decision
Red flags confirmed: an in-depth due diligence is required
Source: ICC (2015); NorthCap analysis (report, section II).
Draft · III.1 to complete

Boeing depends on governments and foreign customers for a large share of its revenue

Exhibit 2Boeing at a glance
35%

of revenue from U.S. government contracts

46%

of revenue from customers outside the U.S.

182k

employees, 86% of them in the U.S.

$ … bn

Revenue 2025 [to add]

Three segmentsto complete

BCA · …%
BDS · …%
BGS · …%

Commercial Airplanes, Defense, Space & Security, Global Services: revenue split, main sites, subsidiaries and joint ventures.

Shareholders above 5%to complete

Shareholder%SourceSpecific risk
…………
…………
The 35% and the 46% overlap through Foreign Military Sales: they are not added up.
Source: The Boeing Company (2026a), Form 10-K; report, section III.

Adverse news is recurrent and spans six risk families, not only the 737 MAX

Exhibit 3Dated episodes by risk family
0episodes · 6 families
Select an episodeEach point is dated and sourced. Click one to read the fact and its source.
Source: U.S. DOJ (2006, 2021, n.d.); U.S. House Committee (2020); Amnesty International (2023); NTSB (2025); U.S. Department of State (2024); Associated Press (2025); Rose (2024b, 2026).

Impact comes from Green&co’s own list; likelihood is our judgement on four criteria

Impact

Set by Green&co’s risk appetite

High
Corruption & influence peddlingNegative PRSupply chainSexismChild labour
Medium
Budget overrunsDelays
Low
Equipment malfunctionsMinor website fluctuations
Not listed
FraudDefence exportsClimate→ impact low
×

Likelihood

Assessed by NorthCap

Past cases

Frequency

Exposure

Current situation

HighRecurring incidents, or a structural exposure shown by figures
MediumAn isolated or dated incident, no structural driver
LowNo allegation found, only an indirect exposure
Source: Green&co risk appetite; NorthCap analysis (report, section IV).

Three of twelve risks are critical, and all three are on Green&co’s own list

Exhibit 4Inherent risk matrix · select a risk for its justification
Source: NorthCap analysis (report, section IV); sources of each risk in the detail panel.

The three critical risks are structural, not accidents of history

1Critical

Corruption and influence peddling

35%
of revenue from U.S. government contracts
  • 46% of revenue from outside the U.S.
  • China scores 43 on the Corruption Perceptions Index
  • Druyun case: $615M paid in 2006
2Critical

Negative public relations incidents

346
deaths in the two 737 MAX crashes (2018–19)
  • Door plug blowout, January 2024
  • Jury awards of $28M and $49.5M (2026)
3Critical

Supply chain disruptions

53 + 101
days of strikes, in 2024 and 2025
  • Few, highly specialised suppliers
  • Spirit AeroSystems: quality failures, then acquisition (2025)
Source: The Boeing Company (2026a); Transparency International (2026); U.S. DOJ (2006); U.S. House Committee (2020); NTSB (2025); Rose (2026); Lewis & Rose (2024).

Low impact is not low importance: four highly likely risks sit outside Green&co’s list

Exhibit 5Sensitivity of the matrix to the impact of added topics
3critical risks
8

Fraud and misleading regulators. Charged in 2021, agreement breached in 2024.

9

Equipment malfunctions. MCAS design flaw; 2024 door plug.

10

Defence exports. JDAM kits in Gaza strikes; $51M penalty in 2024.

11

Climate. 646 Mt CO₂e over the life of the airplanes delivered in 2025.

Source: NorthCap analysis (report, section IV, Figure 1); U.S. DOJ (n.d.); NTSB (2025); Amnesty International (2023); The Boeing Company (2026d).
Draft · align with final section VI

After Boeing’s controls, one of Green&co’s risks remains critical: negative public relations

Exhibit 6From inherent to residual risk · Green&co’s nine listed risks · drag the slider
InherentResidual
Source: NorthCap analysis (report, section VI); Boeing’s published policies and programmes.
Draft · to complete

What a new Boeing scandal would cost Green&co in Belgium [message to write]

Exhibit 7Exposure of Green&co if Boeing is involved in a new case
Green&coBelgium
Source: to add (Belgian law, Sapin II, precedents).
Draft · decision to take

Our answer to Green&co: go, go with conditions, or no go [to decide]

RecommendationTo decide

Conditions, each tied to a residual risk

RecommendationRiskOwnerDeadline
…………
…………
…………
One recommendation per residual risk, with an indicator and a deadline.
Source: NorthCap analysis.
Cap

[Our recommendation in one sentence]

1Three critical risks, all on Green&co’s list: corruption, negative PR, supply chain.
2The exposure is structural: governments, foreign markets, a concentrated supply chain.
3After Boeing’s controls, negative public relations remain critical.
Thank you. Questions?NorthCap · Cap sur l’intégrité

Backup: the questions we expect

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